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This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the responsiveness of asset markets to monetary policy 
path revisions.  In an era of increased transparency and gradualism in policy making, one might 
expect an increased response to path revisions in asset markets as the policy actions become more 
predictable over longer horizons.  Using federal funds futures contracts to extract near-term path 
revisions, we find that the responsiveness of Treasury securities to path revisions is significantly 
asymmetric, increasing during cycles of tightenings and declining during easings.  This is consistent 
with the earlier literature that documents asymmetric effects of monetary policy on output.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last fifteen years, the Federal Reserve took significant steps towards transparency.  
Combined with its history of gradualism, these steps allowed the Fed to expand its control 
over interest rates.  In 1994, the Federal Reserve started announcing changes in the funds rate 
target.  While interest rates have been the primary operational tool that reflected changes in 
the policy stance until 1999, policy statements that accompanied interest rate announcements 
after this date informed the market participants not only about the current policy changes but 
also about the future path of monetary policy.  These developments allowed market 
participants to better understand the decision making process and form more accurate 
forecasts of future policy actions, which accelerated the traditional channels of the monetary 
transmission mechanism.   
During his 2004 speech on “Gradualism” then-governor Bernanke noted that:
1 
“… private-sector expectations play a crucial role in the determination of 
long-term interest rates and other asset prices and yields.  Specifically, by 
leading market participants to anticipate that changes in the policy rate will 
be followed by further changes in the same direction, policy gradualism may 
increase the ability of the Fed to affect long-term rates and thus influence 
economic behavior.” 
In this paper, we explore the responsiveness of asset markets and in particular longer 
term yields to revisions in near-term monetary policy expectations.  In an era of increased 
transparency and improved communication in policy making, one might expect the Federal 
Reserve’s gradualist approach to become more visible to market participants.  When market 
participants get a clearer signal that the changes in the policy rate will be followed by further 
                                                 
1 At an economics luncheon co-sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (Seattle Branch) and 
the University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200405202/default.htm   3
changes in the same direction, longer term yields may get more responsive to policy path 
revisions.   
In this paper, we make several contributions to the literature.  First, in order to 
investigate the responsiveness of longer term yields to policy path revisions, we develop a 
measure for longer term policy expectations.  This measure allows us to document a strong 
asymmetry in the responsiveness of long-term rates to changes in the expected policy path.  
Furthermore, we illustrate that the decline in the effectiveness of monetary policy along the 
yield curve is much more muted during tightening cycles.  This is a refinement over the 
earlier findings of a general decline in the effectiveness of monetary policy at longer horizons 
(see e.g. Cook and Hahn, 1989, Roley and Sellon, 1995, Kuttner, 2001,  Demiralp and Jorda, 
2004, Gürkaynak et al.,2005).  Indeed, these findings tie together the literature on the 
monetary transmission mechanism over the yield curve to the studies that detect an 
asymmetry in the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing output (see e.g. De Long 
and Summers, 1988, Cover, 1992, Morgan, 1993).  Our findings suggest that the Federal 
Reserve is less influential in dealing with recessions because its ability to influence longer 
term interest rates weakens during easing cycles.  In contrast, the Fed’s ability to influence 
longer term rates during times of expansions suggests that the policy maker has the necessary 
policy tools to prick asset market bubbles relatively easily. 
In a second contribution, we provide a dynamic analysis of the responsiveness of asset 
markets to monetary policy path revisions.  The dynamic analysis underlines the evidence of 
an asymmetry where the responsiveness of longer term yields follow the policy cycles.  
However, we do not find any noticeable improvement in the responsiveness of asset markets 
to monetary policy actions over time.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we provide a brief 
literature review on the anticipation effect in asset markets and provide a perspective on the   4
issue.  Section three presents the empirical results while section four concludes.  The 
appendix explains the methodology of calculating policy path revisions based on federal 
funds futures contracts. 
 
 
2.  Anticipation Effect in Asset Markets 
Under the current interest rate targeting regime, the textbook description of the monetary 
transmission mechanism starts with a change in overnight interest rates which leads to 
consequent changes in longer term interest rates through the term structure relationship, and 
changes in the equity prices through the Gordon equation by changing expected excess 
returns.   
What is missing in this textbook description is the asset markets’ response to expected 
monetary policy actions before the policy decision is announced.  Evidence of this type of an 
“anticipation effect” in Treasury markets has been documented in several studies where 
market rates are found to respond to monetary policy actions in the period prior to a target 
change (see e.g. Kuttner, 2001; Lange, Sack, Whitesell, 2003; Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Swanson, 2005).  Meanwhile, Carpenter and Demiralp (2006a) documented an anticipation 
effect in the federal funds market in the days prior to a target change, despite the close control 
by the Trading Desk.   Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) documented an anticipation effect in 
equity markets.  The common understanding in all these studies is that asset markets respond 
to anticipated policy prior to the policy event and they only respond to the unexpected (or the 
surprise) component following the event.   
In this paper, we estimate the anticipation effect in asset markets for a longer time 
horizon which allows us to detect an asymmetric response to policy actions.  Using a near-
term measure for policy expectations, we quantify the asset markets’ response to anticipated 
policy actions six months into the future.  To that end, we consider a methodology to form   5
market expectations based on federal funds futures contracts.  Using this methodology, which 
is an extension of the technique described by Kuttner (2001), we compute the unanticipated 
component of target changes that are related to the current policy action and changes (or 
revisions) in the policy path in the upcoming six months.  This measure of policy path 
revisions allows us to identify a strong asymmetry in the responsiveness of the longer term 
Treasury securities to policy surprises which cannot be detected if unanticipated policy 
actions are measured for horizons less than six months.   
We find that the asset markets’ responsiveness to path revisions are uniformly larger 
relative to their responses to the current month’s policy surprise and the estimated responses 
are equal to their theoretical values of one for suitable maturities.  This should not be 
interpreted as current policy actions are becoming secondary but that their influence comes 
earlier when investors build in expectations of those actions.   
 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
The appendix describes our methodology of calculating policy surprises on the day of 
an FOMC meeting or an intermeeting change as well as for each month into the future (up to 
six months). Furthermore, we calculate the revisions in the expected policy path which are 
constructed as average surprise series over a particular time frame.   
Figure 1 plots the 20-month moving averages of the policy surprise series (Figure 1a) 
as well as the path revisions (Figure 1b).  The surprise series for each future month reflects 
the revisions in the expected target level for that month while the path revisions indicate the 
average changes in the expected policy path in the upcoming months.  The figure highlights 
several interesting observations.  First, easing cycles are generally associated with negative   6
surprises.
2  This may reflect the market’s tendency to form conservative forecasts of the 
future easings during times of recessions. Alternatively, it may be due to the Fed’s tendency 
to surprise the markets by considering target cuts that are larger than anticipated.  Given the 
general trend towards transparency, we believe that the latter is less likely to be the 
underlying reason.  Second, even though the absolute sizes of the surprise series are larger 
during easings relative to tightenings, we do observe a general decline for easings as well as 
tightenings over time.
3 While this pattern is clearly consistent with the steps towards 
transparency, other developments could also contribute to smaller surprises such as fewer and 
smaller target changes (such as the period between 2002 and 2003).   
Moving to the lower panel, we note that path revisions are consistently smaller than 
the surprise series associated with individual months.  This finding is expected because a 
market surprise is frequently about the timing of an expected policy action which is either 
postponed or moved earlier due to the current decision.  Hence, over a six month horizon, 
these timing adjustments cancel each other off, resulting in smaller path revisions.   
                                                 
2 In fact, when we break down the sample into easing cycles, interim periods, and tightening cycles, we observe 
that for a total of 34 observations for which the size of the current month’s surprise was less than -0.05, 29 of 
them  corresponded to easing cycles. The table below provides this breakdown in more detail: 
 










1 > 0.10 
Easing 6/5/89  9/4/92  38  14  11  1  1 
Interim 10/7/92  12/22/93  11  1  0 1  0 
Tightening 2/4/94  2/1/95  10  2  1  6  4 
Easing 3/28/95  5/18/99  35  5 2  2  0 
Tightening 6/30/99  5/16/00  8  1  0  2  0 
Interim 6/28/00  12/19/00  5  0  0 1  0 
Easing 1/31/01  6/25/03  21  6 3  4  1 
Interim 8/12/03  5/4/04  7  0  0 0  0 
Tightening 6/30/04  6/29/06  17  0  0  0  0 
Interim 8/8/06  8/7/07  9  0 0  0  0 
Easing 9/18/07  12/16/08  11  4 3  2  1 
Interim 1/28/09  11/14/09  7  1  0 0  0 
Total     179  34 20  19  7 
 
3 This finding is consistent with Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006b, who also documented a similar decline in the 
unanticipated  policy actions for the current month.   7
In order to investigate the effects of unanticipated policy actions on asset markets, we 
consider a simple specification shown in equation (1): 
t t i t t Surprise d Anticipate A ε β β α + + + = ) ( ) ( 2 1   (1) 
where  t A  is the change in the asset market variable, which is either the daily change in the 
Treasury yield (from three month bills to thirty year bonds), or the CRSP value weighted 
return on day t.  Anticipated refers to the expected monetary policy action, and  i Surprise  
refers to the monetary policy surprise for month i, such that i=1,2,…,6.
4   
Equation (1) is estimated on the days of FOMC meetings and target changes for the 
period after May 1989 when the futures market for the federal funds contracts gained 
sufficient liquidity.  We exclude those intermeeting changes that are followed by FOMC 
meetings within the same month because we need to impose additional restrictive 
assumptions to calculate expected policy changes on these days, as explained in the 
appendix.
5  We also exclude the intermeeting change on September 17, 2001 because the 
markets’ reactions on this day may have been driven by the terrorist attacks.  The sample 
period ends on November 4, 2009.
6 
Equation (1) allows us to compare the responsiveness of asset markets to the 
individual surprise series for each month into the future.  If the expectations hypothesis holds, 
we would expect the market response to anticipated policy actions to be insignificant and the 
response to unanticipated policy to be significant on the event day.   
                                                 
4 We obtained identical results with an alternative specification which omits the anticipated component as in 
Gürkaynak et al.  (2005) or Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004).   
5 We have a total of ten such intermeeting changes followed by FOMC meetings.  The following observations 
are excluded from the analysis: August 10, 1989, November 6, 1989, December 7, 1990, February 1, 1991, 
March 8, 1991, August 6, 1991, December 6, 1991, January 3, 2001,  January 22, 2008 and October 8, 2008. 
6 The sample period for the equity market equation is somewhat shorter because the CRSP data is only available 
through June 30, 2008.   8
The first six bars in Figure 2 plot the coefficient estimates associated with the surprise 
series for these regressions.
7 The anticipated components (not shown) are significant for the 
three-month and six-month Treasury yields but are insignificant for longer yields consistent 
with the expectations hypothesis.  The first six panels in Figure 2 display a declining impact 
of monetary policy on longer term securities.  The coefficient estimates associated with 
surprise 1 are comparable to Kuttner (2001) or Demiralp and Jorda (2004) who conducted 
similar analyses with respect to the current month’s surprise, though the estimates differ from 
the fact that our sample has approximately seven more years of data.   
Figure 2 indicates that for maturities longer than six-months, an increase in the 
surprise horizon  is generally associated with higher responsiveness to policy surprises, which 
peaks around five months.  After ten years, the surprise coefficients for the first two months 
are no longer significant.
8  These findings are intuitive.  Under the gradualist approach that 
the Federal Reserve follows, unanticipated policy actions beyond the current months are 
perceived to signal further changes in the policy stance over the duration of the assets.  
Consequently, as the surprise term covers a horizon further away from the current month, the 
responsiveness of the longer term maturities increase. 
The last panel in Figure 2 shows the estimation results for equity markets.    Bernanke 
and Kuttner (2005) note that equity markets are subject to sizable outliers which may affect 
the empirical results.  We remove these outliers based on the influence statistics similar to 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005).
9,10 The coefficient estimates are negative as in Bernanke and 
                                                 
7 For the three-month Treasury bill equation, we only look at the response to policy surprises for the first three 
months.   
8 We obtain this result for the 30-year bond as well as the 20-year bond (not shown).  Because the results for the 
20-year bond mimic the 30-year bond very closely, we only show the results for the 30-year bond. 
9 In the presence of outliers, none of the surprise series are significant, driven by the sizable outlier on March 18, 
2008. 
10 Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) detect the outliers based on an equation where the CRSP value-weighted index 
is regressed onto anticipated and unanticipated policy actions for the current month.  Because our analysis 
involves the surprise series up to six months, we identify the outliers for each surprise series and path revisions 
separately.  For each equation, we remove those observations whose influence statistics are greater than 0.25.  
These outliers are listed as a footnote under Figure 2.   9
Kuttner (2005) and the size of surprise 1 coefficient (i.e.  the surprise for the current month) 
is comparable to their estimate excluding outliers.  Meanwhile, the coefficient estimates for 
surprises 5 and 6 are not statistically significant, suggesting that equity markets are perhaps 
not as forward looking as the market for Treasury securities.   
The estimation results from equation (1) allowed us to observe the effects of  the 
individual surprise series on asset markets.  How asset markets respond to average path 
revisions is more interesting.  Averaging allows us to control for policy surprises in opposite 
directions which would offset each other over a longer horizon.  This way, we can 
differentiate between policy surprises that have short-lasting effects and those that are more 
persistent.  To that end, we estimate equation (2): 
                t t i t t R d Anticipate A ε β β α + + + = ) ( ) ( 2 1      6 , 3 = i   (2) 
where i R  is the policy path revision averaged over i months, as described in the appendix.   
The results from these regressions are shown by the last bars in Figure 2.  The horizon 
for the policy path revisions is six-months for all assets but two.  For the three-month T-Bill, 
we consider the three-month path revision because this is the horizon that corresponds to the 
maturity of the security.  We also consider the three-month path revision for the CRSP 
equation because our results for the individual surprises indicated that policy surprises for 
longer horizons tend to be insignificant for equity markets.  Indeed, if we consider the six-
month path revision, the coefficient estimate is about two percentage points smaller (but still 
significant).   
 Despite their declining influences at longer maturities, path revisions generally 
generate higher responses in asset markets relative to the individual surprise series.   By and 
large, these findings conform with Gürkaynak et al., 2005, who also investigated the 
responsiveness of asset markets to target changes and longer term revisions.  Different from 
                                                                                                                                                        
   10
their findings, however, we find that the stock market’s response to path revisions is larger 
than its response to the current month’s target surprise.
11   
So far our analysis reiterated the earlier findings of a diminishing influence of 
monetary policy over longer term maturities (Kuttner, 2001, Demiralp and Jorda, 2004) and 
extended this finding for policy surprises beyond the current month.  Is this a general result 
that holds during tightenings as well as easings, or is there an asymmetry in the effectiveness 
of monetary policy depending on the sign of the policy action? The asymmetric influence of 
monetary policy on output has been documented earlier.  The argument is that monetary 
policy is less effective during easings due to factors such as a loss of confidence by firms and 
consumers during recessions, credit constraints that supplement only tight policy, and less 
downward flexibility of prices.  In this section, we investigate the implications of this 
asymmetry over the yield curve.  We believe that the monetary policy’s asymmetric influence 
on output necessitates an asymmetric influence over longer-term yields.  By illustrating this 
claim empirically, we can provide the missing link between the asymmetric monetary policy 
literature and the term structure literature.   
We consider the following specification to check whether monetary policy’s influence 
over the yield curve is asymmetric: 
                t
Tight
t i t i t t D R R d Anticipate A ε β β β α + + + + = ) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1      6 , 3 = i   (3) 
where 
Tight D  is a dummy variable that captures policy tightenings.  In this 
specification  2 β  reflects the response of asset markets to target cuts or FOMC meetings with 
no target change, while  3 2 β β +  reflects the response to rate hikes.  If monetary policy is 
                                                 
11 This could arise from the different methodologies in calculating path revisions or the fact that they 
investigated intraday changes whereas we look at daily changes in asset markets.  Gürkaynak, Sack, and 
Swanson (2005) decomposed policy surprises into a component that is related to the target change and another 
component that is related to the future path of policy through factor analysis.  Looking at a narrow window 
around the time of target announcement, they found that the impact of the path factor was generally about 10 to 
15 basis points larger than the impact of the target change for the long end of the yield curve.  As for the stock 
market, however, the impact of the path factor was smaller than the effect of changes in the target. 
   11
more effective in slowing down aggregate output during expansions, and if this is because 
monetary policy has better control over longer term yields during tightenings, then  3 β  as well 
as 3 2 β β +  should be significant across the yield curve.   
Figure 3 displays the coefficient estimates from equation (3).  In order to compare 
these results to those from equation (2), we label the policy path estimates from equation (2) 
as “combined” to note the fact that these estimates are obtained for a combined sample with 
all event dates.  The first thing we note in Figure 3 is the strong asymmetry in favor of 
tightenings along the yield curve.  The dummy variables for tightenings ( 3 β ) are statistically 
significant for all assets but the six-month Treasury bill and the equity market.
12  Even then, 
3 2 β β +  is insignificantly different from its theoretical value of one for the six-month T-
Bill.
13 Second, although there is an observed decline in the effectiveness of monetary policy 
along the yield curve, it is much more muted in the case of tightenings.  In fact, the gap 
between the estimates obtained for the combined sample and those for tightenings widens as 
we move along the yield curve.  Meanwhile, no asymmetry is detected for the equity 
market.
14  
Figure 3 has important implications for policy making.  It supports the findings in the 
earlier literature that tight monetary policy is more effective as a stabilization policy and 
attributes this finding to the policy’s better control over longer term interest rates.  It is 
important to note that the evidence of an asymmetry is only detected with our six-month 
policy path revisions.   Shorter-term policy surprises such as unanticipated policy actions for 
the current month or even three-month path revisions fail to uncover this asymmetric 
                                                 
12 Furthermore,  2 β  is significantly different from  3 2 β β +  in all the cases where 3 β  is significant. 
13 Note that only for the case of three-month and six-month Treasury bills, the horizon of the path revision is the 
same as the maturity of the security.  Therefore, if the expectations hypothesis holds, we would expect the 
coefficient estimates associated with path revisions to be equal to one for these securities.  There is no 
theoretical restriction for the other securities, however. 
14 Similar to the earlier estimates, the outliers are excluded for the stock market equation.   12
response (not shown) likely because longer term rates’ response to short-term surprises are 
too small to allow for any asymmetry.   
 
 
A Dynamic Perspective 
The evidence in the previous section suggests that the Federal Reserve is quite 
influential in controlling longer term interest rates during times of tightenings.  It would be 
interesting to see if this ability has evolved over time or more generally if the responsiveness 
of asset markets changed in a dynamic setting.  This question is particularly relevant for 
understanding the current crisis because many people attributed the crisis at least partly to the 
Federal Reserve’s inability to increase the longer-term rates in mid-2004. 
Figure 4 plots the federal funds rate target together with the three-month, ten-year, 
and thirty-year Treasury yields from May 1989 through December 2008.  During that period, 
short term interest rates followed the funds rate target closely as shown by the close 
correlation between the target and the three-month Treasury bill.  Longer-term rates also 
followed the target closely for the most of the sample except for the Fed’s most recent 
tightening cycle from June 2004 through June 2006 (the shaded area).  Despite the fact that 
the target was increased 425 basis points during this period, longer term rates hardly changed 
as illustrated by the 30-year bond.
15  It was argued that the Fed’s lack of control over longer 
term rates, in particular the mortgage rates, was responsible for the housing price bubble 
which triggered the crisis in August 2007. 
Was the Federal Reserve as powerless in controlling the longer term rates during the 
2004-2006 tightening cycle as suggested? Could the global savings glut be responsible for 
reducing the Fed’s control over longer-term rates during that period? Or could the simple 
                                                 
15The 30-year Treasury constant maturity series was discontinued on February 18, 2002, and reintroduced on 
February 9, 2006.  Because of this break, we use the secondary market data in our analysis.   13
correlations displayed in Figure 4 disguise the true connections between policy expectations 
and longer term interest rates?   
These questions can be investigated in a dynamic framework via rolling regressions.  
Rolling regressions of equation (2) allow us to spot any changes in the responsiveness of 
asset markets to Federal Reserve Policy.  Figure 5 displays the dynamic response of Treasury 
securities to six-month path revisions over 20-observation rolling windows.  We keep the 
estimation window relatively short to capture individual policy cycles.  However, because the 
estimation window is rather small, our rolling regression analysis is more sensitive to 
outliers.  In order to make sure that our results are not driven by these outliers, we detect and 
exclude them for each security based on their influence statistics.  In the figure, we only show 
the results for the six-month Treasury bill, 5-and 10-year Treasury notes, and the 30-year 
Treasury bond to avoid repetition because the results for closer maturities are very similar.  
The lists of outliers for each security are provided as an end-note in Figure 5.   
The upper left panel in Figure 5 displays the response of the six-month bill.
16 We plot 
the target series as the solid line to observe how the responsiveness of the security changes 
along the business cycle.  The response of the six-month T-bill is highly significant 
throughout the analysis, hovering around its theoretical value of one.  The coefficient 
estimates tend to increase during tightenings and decrease during easings but the evidence of 
an asymmetry is rather negligible.   
The upper right panel shows the response of the five-year Treasury note.  The 
evidence of an asymmetry is much more pronounced this time, where the coefficient 
estimates increase substantially during tightenings and decrease during easings.  Furthermore, 
we observe an overall increase in the responsiveness of this asset, which is particularly 
                                                 
16 Because we have identified (and excluded) the outliers based on our influence statistics, the small sample 
results based on each rolling window do not exhibit any large fluctuations.  Nevertheless, because the outliers 
are detected based on the full sample and not based on each sub-sample (we believe such a procedure would be 
rather ad-hoc) it is natural to observe some fluctuations in the coefficient estimates associated with alternative 
surprise series.   14
noticeable for tightenings.   This finding is consistent with the implications of gradualism and 
improved transparency which may suggest an enhancement of the Fed’s ability to control 
longer term rates as suggested by Bernanke (2004). 
The lower left panel illustrates the responsiveness of the ten-year note.  The evidence 
of an asymmetry becomes even more observable as the maturity of the security lengthens, 
consistent with our earlier findings in Figure 3.  Indeed, the responsiveness to path revisions 
during the 2001-2003 easing cycle becomes mostly insignificant for this security.   
The last panel in Figure 5 displays the response of the 30-year bond.  The evidence of 
an asymmetry is pronounced.  Even though there is an overall decline in the coefficient 
estimates relative to shorter maturities, their values approach one during the last tightening 
cycle in 2004-2006.  This finding suggests that despite the common perception of a 
disconnect between the longer-term rates and the target rate during this time period, the 
responses of longer-term assets were highly consistent with longer-term policy expectations.   
Figure 6 displays the dynamic responses of Treasury securities to three-month path 
revisions.  The responsiveness of 5-, 10- and 30-year securities tend to be smaller in 
magnitude compared to their responses to six-month path revisions.  This is expected because 
the longer the horizon of the path revision, the more we expect it to influence longer-term 
investment decisions.  While the response of the three-month Treasury bill is almost always 
significant and close to one, the responsiveness of the 5-year note is statistically insignificant 
in many instances.  Similar observations can be made with respect to the dynamic responses 
of the 10-year note and the 30-year bond.   
Figure 7 shows the rolling regression results for equity markets.  Our earlier findings 
in Figure 2 suggested that this market is not as forward looking as the rest of the asset 
markets.  For that reason, we consider the three-month path revision as the proper measure of 
expectations.  Figure 7 reiterates our findings in Figure 3 that there is no observable   15
difference in the responsiveness of the stock market during times of tightenings or easings.  
Stock market response becomes significant in 1993 remains significant until the middle of the 
tightening cycle in 1994.  It becomes significant again through the end of the easing cycle in 
2002 and remains significant until the middle of the tightening cycle in late 2005.   
Comparing these two clusters of significant coefficient estimates,  there seems to be an 
increase in the responsiveness of the stock market over time, although this trend is not well-
pronounced.   It is also interesting to note that during the brief tightening cycle of late 1999 
and early 2000,  as well as the end of the tightening cycle in 2006 the stock market response 
became positive though not statistically significant.   
 
Conclusions 
In this paper we analyzed the responsiveness of asset markets to monetary policy path 
revisions.  Our findings underlined a strong asymmetry in the responsiveness of longer term 
Treasury yields to path revisions.  We found that the monetary policy is more influential in 
controlling longer-term rates during times of tightenings than easings.  This finding provides 
a smooth transition from the term structure literature to the literature that found asymmetric 
effects of monetary policy on output. 
Our results highlight the importance of gradualism and transparency in improving the 
central banks’ control over longer term interest rates that most affect the economy.  A 
common misperception of monetary policy is to think of the Federal Reserve as setting 
interest rates in the economy.  In fact, Federal Reserve only sets the federal funds rate target.  
The federal funds rate is not important by itself because only a small fraction of total 
borrowing is done at that rate.  Longer-term interest rates are far more significant than the 
funds rate, because those are the rates that are relevant for most of the spending and 
investment decisions.     16
Although the central banks cannot directly determine long-term interest rates, they 
can influence those rates through the formation of private-sector expectations about future 
monetary policy actions.  In that respect, the performance of the central bank can be 
evaluated by its ability to control long term interest rates.   Using a measure for longer-term 
policy expectations, our results suggested that the Federal Reserve’s policy of gradualism and 
transparency is indeed very successful in aligning longer term interest rates with policy 
expectations, particularly during periods of tightenings.     17
Data Appendix 
 
Federal funds futures data are obtained from CME. 
 
CRSP value weighted return (including dividends) for NYSE and Alternext (what used to 
be AMEX) is obtained through Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). 
 
The data for the target funds rate before 1994 is also obtained from the Board of 
Governors and after 1994, is from FOMC transcripts.   
 
The data for Treasury rates are obtained from the Board of Governors, H.15 release.  We 
use the secondary market rates for Treasury bills and constant maturity rates for longer 
maturities except for the 30-year bond.  Because of the break in the 30-year Treasury 
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Figure 1a: Monetary Policy Surprises 




Figure 1b: Monetary Policy Path Revisions 
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Figure 2: The Response of Asset Markets to Policy Surprises and Path Revisions 





S1: Surprise 1, S2: Surprise 2,S3: Surprise 3, S4: Surprise 4, S5: Surprise 5, S6: Surprise 6, R3: three-month 
revision, R6: Six-month revision, T3: Three-month Treasury bill, T6: Six-month Treasury bill, T2Y: Two-year 
Treasury note, T5Y: Five-year Treasury note, T10Y: Ten-year Treasury note, T30Y: Thirty-year Treasury bond. 
 
The coefficient estimates are significant at 95 percent level of confidence.  The coefficient estimate for S1 is not 
significant for the 30-year Bond.  The coefficient estimates for  S5 and S6 are not significant for equity markets.   
 
The following outliers are excluded from the CRSP regressions:  
Surprise 1: 8/21/1991, 7/2/1992, 2/4/1994, 3/20/2001, 4/18/2001, 3/18/2008 
Surprise 2: 8/21/1991, 7/2/1992, 10/15/1998, 3/20/2001, 4/18/2001, 3/18/2008, 12/16/2008 
Surprise 3:, 9/4/1992, 4/18/2001, 3/18/2008, 12/16/2008 
Surprise 4: 7/2/1992, 2/4/1994, 4/18/2001, 9/18/2007, 3/18/2008, 12/16/2008 
Surprise 5: 7/2/1992, 2/4/1994, 4/18/2001, 9/18/2007, 3/18/2008, 12/16/2008 
Surprise 6: 7/8/1993, 4/18/2001, 9/18/2007, 3/18/2008, 12/16/2008 
3-month revision: 7/2/1992, 9/4/1992, 10/15/1998, 4/18/2001, 3/18/2008 
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Figure 3: The Asymmetric Response of Asset Markets 







T3: Three-month Treasury bill, T6: Six-month Treasury bill, T2Y: Two-year Treasury note, 




The coefficient estimates are significant at 95 percent level of confidence.  The coefficient 
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Figure 4: Selected Interest Rates 
 (monthly frequency) 
 
 
The shaded area corresponds to the Federal Reserve’s tightening cycle from June 30, 2004 
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Figure 5: The Dynamic Response of Treasury Securities to Six-Month Path Revisions 
(in percentage points) 
 
Notes:  
The following outliers are excluded from the response estimates to 6-month path revisions:  6-month T.  Bill: 8/21/1991, 12/20/1991, 9/4/1992, 4/18/2001, 3/18/2008, 
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a) 6-month Treasury Bill  26
 
Figure 6: The Dynamic Response of Treasury Securities to Three-Month Path  Revisions 
(in percentage points) 
Notes: 
 The following outliers are excluded from the response estimates to 3-month path revisions: 3-month T-Bill: 8/21/1991, 12/20/1991, 4/9/1992, 7/2/1992, 9/4/1992, 5/20/1997, 
4/18/2001, 3/18/2008, 9/16/2008; 5-year Note: 10/16/1989, 7/2/1992, 9/4/1992, 4/18/1994, 4/18/2001, 3/18/2008; 10-year Note: 10/16/1989, 12/20/1991, 7/2/1992, 9/4/1992, 
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d) 30-year Bond  27
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Appendix:   Measuring Market Expectations 
 
In this section, we describe the methodology that is used to calculate policy expectations.  
This methodology is an extension of Kuttner (2001), who used a market-based measure to 
identify unexpected funds rate changes based on the price of federal funds futures contracts.  
Several researchers considered extensions of this analysis to capture longer-term 
expectations.   For example, Gürkaynak (2005) computed policy expectations for the future 
FOMC meetings.  Demiralp (2008) computed policy expectations for the next three months.  
The analysis in this paper uses a similar method to gauge the revisions in the policy path in 
the future months.   
In order to estimate revisions in the policy path, we need to understand how the target 
change on day t affects policy expectations in future months.  We assume the market expects 
the average overnight rate for a given month to be equal to the funds rate target as in Kuttner 
(2001).  This assumption is strongly supported by the data for our sample period, as daily 
deviations from the target are only temporary (see Carpenter and Demiralp, 2006a).  
Furthermore, we assume that on the day of a target change t, future policy changes are only 
expected on regularly scheduled FOMC days.   
 
Market Expectations in Month 1 
As described in Kuttner (2001), the interest rate of the federal funds futures contract 
on a particular day t reflects the expected average funds rate for that month, conditional on 
the information prevailing up to that date.
17  Based on this fact and knowing that the effective 
funds rate as a monthly average is very close to the target rate (typically within a few basis 
points), the current month (or “spot-month”) futures rate (FF1) on the  day before a target 
change can be expressed as: 
                                                 
17 Naturally, this measure presumes that market participants are aware of the target and can observe the changes.  
If the market participants were unaware that the target had changed, expectations would not necessarily reflect 
the changes in the policy instrument.     29
1
1
1 1 1 0
1








T E t m T t
FF µ   (A.1) 
where  0 T  is the funds rate target on day t-1,  1 T  is the funds rate target on day t,  1 − t E is the 
expectations operator based on information as of day t-1,  and  1 − t µ  is a term that may 
represent the risk premium or day of month effects in the futures market.  In an efficient 
market with risk-neutral investors, this term would be zero.   1 m  is the total number of days in 
month 1.   
Assuming that the target change occurs on day t, the spot rate (FF1) on day t is given 
by: 
t t m
T t m T t
FF µ +
× − + ×
=
1
1 1 0 ) (
1   (A.
2) 
The difference between the spot-month rates prior to and after the target change i.e.  
(A.2)-(A.1), gives us the policy surprise for the current month ( 1 Surprise ) as of day t 
assuming that the term premium remains constant: 
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Equation (A.3) is used to compute the policy surprise except for two cases: 
1.  Kuttner notes that the day-t targeting error and the revisions in the expectation of 
future targeting errors may be non-trivial at the end of the month.  Consequently, if a target 
change occurs in the last five days of the month, the difference in one-month futures rate 
(FF2) is used to derive the policy surprise since the one-month rate reflects the expected 
average funds rate for the next month:
18 
                                                 
18 To be more precise, Kuttner (2003) considers the “end of month” to be the last three days of the month.  We 
slightly extend this period to include the last five days of the month to eliminate the sensitivity of our results to 
some target changes that took place in this interval.  This is a legitimate generalization because if a target   30
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  2.  If the target change takes place on the first day of the month, we need to use the 
one-month futures rate from the previous month to assess market’s expectations on day 1.     
   
4 43 4 42 1
1
)] ( [ ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1
Surprise
t t t T E T FF FF − − − Φ = − , where  1
1
1 = = Φ
m
m
                                     (A.5) 
Kuttner sets  1 = Φ  for simplicity, assuming that the new target is effective as of the 
day of the target change.  Because the majority of our sample covers the post-1994 period 
where target change announcements were made in the afternoon (and after the open market 
operations for that day were already executed), we assume that the new target is effective as 












 The calculation of the surprises (or path revisions) for future months follow the same 
general principle and are discussed next. 
 
Market Expectations in Month 2 
a) No FOMC Meeting in Month 2 
If there is no FOMC meeting in the second month, then, the policy surprise in that 
month is the same as the market surprise from the first month ( 1 Surprise ):   
1 2 Surprise Surprise =  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
change takes place within the last five days (or the last three days) of a given month, then no FOMC meeting is 
scheduled for the next month in both cases, which is the necessary assumption to make this adjustment.  
Gürkaynak (2005) applied a similar adjustment for target changes that took place within the last week of the 
month.  In a recent paper, Hamilton (2008) points out the elevated end-of-month volatility in the federal funds 
rate and highlights that the underlying assumption about the funds rate being equal to target may fail towards the 
end of the month, which supports our month-end adjustment for an extended interval.     31
 
b) FOMC meeting on day k of Month 2 
If there is an FOMC meeting on day k of the next month, then one-month futures 
contract (FF2) as of day t-1 (in the current month) is equal to: 
2
2 1 2 1 1
1
) ( ) ( ) (
2
m








where  1 T is the funds rate target as of day t in month one,  2 T  is the funds rate target after day 
k in month two, E  is the expectations operator, and  2 m  is the number of days in month 2. 
Taking the difference between the price of the one-month contract between days t and 
t-1: 
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(A.7) 
The term on the left hand side in equation (A.7) gives the market surprise for the 
second month ( 2 Surprise ) which is related to the surprise from the first month.  The intuition 
is rather simple: total change in one-month futures rate on day t consists of two parts: 
revisions in expectations for overnight rates that are expected to prevail until day k of next 
month (which is the market surprise for the current target change), and revisions in 
expectations for overnight rates that are expected to prevail after day k next month 
( 2 Surprise ).  Hence, we can identify the remainder of the market surprise for the next month 
by subtracting current month’s surprise from the total revision.   
Equation (A.7) is used to obtain the market surprise for most days of the month except 
for:    32
i.  If an FOMC meeting is scheduled in the last five days of the next month (i.e.  
) 5 2 < − k m , the difference in the two-month futures rate is used to derive 
the policy surprise since it reflects the expected average funds rate for the 
following month: 
4 43 4 42 1
2
)] (   - [ ) 3 ( - ) 3 ( 2 1 2 1
Surprise
t t t T E T FF FF − − Φ = ,  where 1 = Φ   (A.8) 
 
ii.  If  the target change takes place on the first day of the current month 
(i.e. 1 = t ), we use the two-month futures rate from the previous month to 
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iii.  If the target change takes place on the first day of the current month 
(i.e. 1 = t ) and if an FOMC meeting is scheduled in the last five days of the 
next month (i.e.   ) 5 2 < − k m , the difference in the two-month futures rate  
and the three month futures rate from the previous month is used to derive 
the policy surprise: 
  
4 43 4 42 1
2
)] ( [ ) 4 ( ) 3 ( 2 1 2 1
Surprise
t t t T E T FF FF − − − Φ = − , where  1 = Φ   (A.10) 
 
Market Expectations in Month j 
The above methodology can be extended to any month j into the future such that: 
If there is no FOMC meeting in month j, then  j Surprise = 1 − j Surprise  
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Surprise , if t=1, and 
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( − + − + = t t j J FF J FF Surprise , for the last five days of month j. 
1 ) 2 ( ) 1 ( − + − + = t t j J FF J FF Surprise , if the target change takes place on the  
          first day of the current month (i.e. 1 = t ) 
                                                            and an FOMC meeting is scheduled on  
                                                           the last days of month j (i.e.   ) 5 < −k m j .   
 
Intermeeting changes with FOMC meeting later in the month 
 
Using the above methodology, policy revisions for the current month as well as future 
months can be calculated for each target change except for intermeeting changes followed by 
an FOMC meeting in the same month.  In the latter case, one has to impose additional 
assumptions which may be questionable.  To illustrate this point, suppose there is an 
intermeeting change on day t with an FOMC meeting scheduled later in the month on day k, 
such that k> t. 
The spot-month contract on day t-1 reflects the average funds rate expected in that 
month: 
1
2 1 1 1 1 0
1
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1
m






− + − +
=  
(A.12) 
where:   34
0 T  is the target prior to the intermeeting change,  1 T  is the target after the intermeeting change 
until the FOMC day, and  2 T  is the target after the FOMC day.  If the market does not 
anticipate an intermeeting change, then  0 1 1 ) ( T T Et = − .  If there are no further changes after the 
intermeeting change, then  1 T = 2 T . 
On the day of the intermeeting change, the price of the spot month contract is equal 
to: 
m
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(A.14) 
In (A.14), the first term in the numerator reflects the unanticipated component of the 
target after the intermeeting change while the second term reflects the revision in 
expectations for the target after the FOMC meeting.  Therefore, unless  ) ( ) ( 2 1 2 T E T E t t − = , the 
second term is nonzero and one cannot identify the unanticipated component of the target 
after the intermeeting change.  The second term will only be equal to zero if the market does 
not revise the target level expected after the FOMC meeting.  While it may be plausible under 
certain scenarios, this is a stronger assumption which may not necessarily hold in all such 
cases, and we check the robustness of our findings by excluding these observations from the 
sample in our empirical analysis.   
 
Path Revisions   35
Our methodology of calculating policy surprises for each month i into the future 
allows us to estimate average path revisions over a particular period.  Indeed, if financial 
markets are rational and forward looking, we expect them to respond to average changes in 
the policy path in the “foreseeable future”, consistent with the Federal Reserve’s signals 
about changes in the policy path over that time frame.   
In order to illustrate the relevance of path revisions in understanding market response 
to monetary policy actions, consider the following example.  Suppose the target is at 4 ¾ 
percent and the market expects three 25 basis points easings in the next three meetings.  So 
the expected policy path is -0.25, -0.25, and -0.25 for each consecutive FOMC meeting 
respectively.  Instead, suppose that the FOMC does not change the target in the first month 
and the market revises its expected path changes as: 0, -0.50, -0.25.   That is, the 25 basis 
points action that was expected in the first month is postponed to the next meeting with no 
change in the 3-month ahead expectations.  Here, focusing on the -25 basis points surprise for 
the current month would overlook the adjustments to the policy path.  In particular, the 
market’s reaction to the current surprise would likely be muted in this scenario, because the 
market simply postpones an expected policy action by one month.  Similarly, only looking at 
the longer term changes in, say, month 3 would also be insufficient because the three-month 
futures would suggest no revisions at all and underestimate the market’s response.  Instead, 
the market’s response to monetary policy should be evaluated as a combined response to its 
path revision for months one, two, and three (and probably even longer).   
Path revisions are estimated in the following manner.  Recall that  j m is the number of 
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1
.  Furthermore, let  1 t be the day of a target change in month 1 and  j t  be the day 
of an FOMC meeting in month j,  j >1.  Then,    36
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(A.16) 
where  i R  refers to the total path revision in the i -month period into the future.   
 
Overall Evaluation 
Two issues are important for the reliability of the generalization discussed in this 
section.  The first one is the constancy of the term premium between the consecutive days of 
a contract for any maturity.  In other words, the monetary policy action should not change the 
term premium from one day to another.  In a recent study, Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) 
tested this assumption formally and illustrated that the above methodology of looking at the 
one-day changes in the federal funds rate contracts is not contaminated by the term premium 
because most of the term premium is “differenced out”.  Sack (2004)’s findings also support 
this assumption by noting that the term premium for federal funds futures contracts is very 
small.    The second issue regarding the reliability of the methodology is the liquidity of 
futures contracts for longer maturities.  As noted by earlier researchers, the liquidity of longer 
term contracts had been relatively thin in the early part of the sample, which led researchers 
to express their concerns about using these longer horizon contracts in extracting information 
on monetary policy expectations (see e.g. Hamilton, 2008, Gürkaynak, 2005, Sack, 2004).  
For this reason, we stop the analysis at the six month horizon.   
 
The Period After December 2008   37
The calculation of expectations in the manner described in this appendix depends on 
the underlying value of the target rate for the current month.  This necessitates a decision 
after December 2008.  Following its meeting on December 16, 2008, the FOMC adopted a 
range for the target rate from 0 to 25 basis points.  In our estimations, we calculate three sets 
of surprise and revision series for possible target values of 0, 12 ½, and 25 basis points after 
December 16, 2008.  Because the results are not sensitive to the underlying choice of the 
target, we only report the results that uses the mid-value of the range of 12 ½  basis points.   
 
 